Before
The Ohio House of Representatives
Energy Committee
Testimony on House Bill 15
(Amend competitive retail electric service law)
Maureen Willis, Agency Director
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel
On Behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel
February 12, 2025
Hello Chair Holmes, Vice-Chair Klopfenstein, Ranking Member Glassburn, and Committee members. I hope you and your colleagues are well. Thank you for this opportunity to testify as a proponent of House Bill 15.
My name is Maureen Willis. I am the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, the Director of OCC. OCC is the state agency that has been the voice for Ohio residential utility consumers for almost fifty years. I am testifying on behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, for Ohio’s 4.5 million residential utility consumers.
OCC supports H.B. 15 and thanks Rep. Klopfenstein for his work on this consumer protection legislation. The legislation restores the General Assembly’s vision in 1999 to deregulate power plants to bring the benefits of electric competition to Ohio utility consumers. That vision was impaired by the 2008 Energy law when so-called electric security plans were created with their increased involvement of government regulators.
In my testimony I will touch upon the most significant aspects of H.B. 15 as they affect Ohio utility consumers. I appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on these important energy matters and look forward to continued dialogue with members.
Overview:
OCC supports the Mission Statement of this Committee enumerated by Chair Holmes. We all want Ohio’s energy policy to support strong economic growth, increase personal well-being, and improve the quality of life for all Ohio citizens.
Under Ohio law, Ohioans are entitled to necessary and adequate utility service at reasonable rates.1 State electric policy also requires that at-risk consumers 2 be protected and that the state’s competitiveness in the global economy be facilitated.3 House Bill 15 will help achieve these state policies.
For too long, the regulatory environment in Ohio has heavily favored utilities over consumers. Ohioans deserve legislation that restores fairness and balance to this system. H.B. 15 is a step in the right direction.
H.B. 15 goes “back to the future” by restoring the General Assembly’s vision in 1999 for power plant deregulation and the benefits of competition for consumers. That vision was impaired in the 2008 Energy Law with the creation of the so-called electric security plans with their increased involvement of government regulators. The 2008 Energy law contained a dramatic shift –favoring monopoly utilities over consumers – in the ratemaking process that affects the electric bills for millions of Ohio consumers and businesses. The result for consumers has been more charges in the form of so-called “riders” and higher charges for paying subsidies to monopoly utilities. Under this legislation the electric security plans with their add-on charges and subsidies would end.
H.B. 15 also repeals the costly coal plant subsidies to Ohio utilities for two coal plants, Kyger Creek and Clifty Creek. These are the so-called “OVEC” (Ohio Valley Electric Corporation) plants. These coal subsidies to AEP, AES and Duke were codified under tainted H.B. 6. These coal subsidies are charged to Ohioans across the state through a charge known as the “Legacy Generation Resource Rider.” Importantly, getting rid of the coal plant subsidies will not mean the coal plants will shut down or jobs will be lost. 4
Since 2020, these coal plant subsidies have cost consumers $433 million.5 These coal plant subsidies cost Ohioans $440,000 a day.6 The subsidies need to end now and not linger on collecting millions more from Ohioans over the next several years. Refunds to consumers for these subsidies would also be a good addition to this legislation.
H.B. 15 preserves the utility standard service offer, the safety net for consumers. This is important for consumers because it allows consumers who do not want to shop for generation to nonetheless benefit from the competitive electric market. H.B. 15 also strengthens governmental aggregation programs which are another safe way for consumers to save money on their electric bill.
Aggregation is a cost-effective means to get a substantial number of residential consumers to participate in the competitive market. By bringing together a large number of consumers, aggregators are able to achieve better pricing than individual consumers could obtain on their own. Aggregation has been a success for consumers who want to shop for their energy services, but don’t’ have the time or inclination to participate in the market through individual retail contracts.
H.B. 15 also continues to preclude utilities from owning generation. Allowing utilities back into the generation market, with guaranteed ratepayer funding, will destroy the competitive market which is working to bring consumers lower electricity prices and greater innovation. Deregulation of power plants works for Ohio families and businesses. Deregulation has contributed to competitive wholesale markets producing billions of dollars in savings for Ohio electric consumers. Researchers at Cleveland State University concluded that Ohioans had saved over $37 billion since 2011 due to deregulation and are on course to save another $2.7 billion in 2024. See https://www.nopec.org/media/iancc405/24nop032-wp_summarypage_r2_hi_20nov2024.pdf).
H.B. 15 also introduces some protections for consumers shopping for their gas or electric supply. It addresses the very common problems that consumers encounter when they sign a contract with a beginning low fixed price (teaser rate) for utility service. Such consumer protection is welcome. But more is needed to prevent consumers from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous marketers. Ohioans would benefit if H.B. 15 included the additional protection provided by a ban on door-to-door marketing to consumers. Existing PUCO rules do not provide sufficient protection.
I suggest a few clarifications or modifications regarding certain provisions of this legislation for your consideration. These suggested changes, if adopted, can offer additional consumer protection and further reduce utility costs for Ohio families and businesses.
CONTINUED DEREGULATION OF POWER PLANTS
The Ohio Consumers’ Counsel commends the General Assembly for its landmark law in 1999 that deregulated power plants. Before Ohio’s 1999 deregulation law, the PUCO was responsible for ensuring power plant reliability for Ohio consumers. That process created a challenge for state government to review massive utility investments in power plants and the related charges to consumers.
That old structure is to be distinguished from the current (and better) approach where Ohioans benefit from the far greater energy resources that can be called upon in the PJM region for reliability. And Ohioans have benefited from competition (instead of state regulation) for better prices and greater innovations. A FirstEnergy Vice-President emphasized these benefits in testimony before the Ohio House Public Utilities Committee: “…competitive markets work.
They deliver the lowest price over the long-term to consumers, and the proof is undeniable.” (Testimony of Leila Vespoli, October 19, 2011).
Power plants should remain a competitive market offering without monopoly utilities “competing” at the expense of their captive consumers.
REPEAL OF COAL SUBSIDIES
Subsidies disrupt markets and in turn harm Ohio consumers. We share the anti-bailout view of AARP. The AARP Policy Book 2019-2020 contains AARP’s policy to “exclude subsidies or bailouts of generation facilities.” (See https://policybook.aarp.org/node/4361.)
Others, including the General Assembly, have endorsed this assessment. One of the key consumer protections of the 1999 electric deregulation law is Ohio Revised Code 4928.38. It states: “The utility's receipt of transition revenues shall terminate at the end of the market development period. With the termination of that approved revenue source, the utility shall be fully on its own in the competitive market.” (Emphasis added.) Those are words to live by, for electric deregulation and consumer protection.
State government should stop propping up old inefficient power plants, that cannot compete in the wholesale markets, at consumer expense. The market development period ended a decade ago. But Ohio utilities still have their hands out for corporate welfare from state government, at public expense. The coal subsidy for the two coal plants is preventing the competitive market from benefiting Ohioans with lower electric bills and a cleaner planet.
The financial burden of coal subsidies collected by AEP, AES and Duke on all Ohioans is enormous and well-documented, as recognized by Bill Sponsor Klopfenstein. Since the coal subsidies were written into law in 2020, Ohioans will have paid close to half a billion dollars to Duke, AES Ohio and AEP through the first half of 2025.7 The coal subsidies are costing utility consumers $440,000 a day.8
Before I offer OCC’s thoughts on an ending date to the coal subsidies, I want to quickly dispel some misconceptions you may have about these coal subsidies.
- Contrary to what you may have heard, the coal plant subsidies paid by utility consumers are not used to support the operation of the plants. These subsidies serve no purpose other than to line the pockets of the three Ohio electric utilities that own a share of the plants.
- The two coal plants operate and will continue to operate without subsidies from utility consumers. According to a Duke executive, the plants will continue to run even if the subsidies from consumers end.9 This is not about preserving jobs or electricity generation for Ohioans.
- The existence and the operation of the coal plants does little to address the possible “surge” in energy demand from data centers and other economic development in Ohio. The energy produced by the plants is not dedicated to Ohio but gets bid into the regional power market that Ohio belongs to.
- The coal plant subsidies have not worked as a hedge against rising electricity prices, despite claims otherwise. The two Eisenhower era plants (one in Indiana) are outdated and inefficient. They produce power at a cost that is higher (sometimes much higher) than the market price of electricity. That is not expected to change in the future, even with higher market prices for electricity.10
H.B. 15 is right to end these coal subsidies. The coal subsidy should be repealed. And the PUCO should be prohibited from reinstating the coal plant subsidy. Let the market work.
As background, currently, three Ohio investor-owned utilities currently have an ownership interest in OVEC, as “sponsoring” companies, Ohio Power (19.93%), AES (4.9%) and Duke Energy Ohio (9%), for a total ownership of 33.8%. In October 1952, OVEC was formed to provide electric service to uranium enrichment facilities being constructed by the Atomic Energy Commission in Southern Ohio under an Inter-Company Power Agreement. OVEC’s two generating plants began operations in 1955. The power agreement with the government was to last through December 31, 2002. On December 29, 2000, however, the U.S. Department of Energy notified OVEC that it would be cancelling the power agreement on April 30, 2003. Since April 30, 2003, the power and capacity from OVEC has been sold into the wholesale electric markets.
It was in 2006 when AEP, Duke, DP&L, and others decided to extend the OVEC agreement until 2030. And again, in 2011, they decided to extend the agreement – this time until 2040. As the coal plants became unprofitable, AEP, Duke and DP&L came looking to state government to make consumers pay subsidies to cover these utility losses.
The PUCO answered that call. The PUCO allowed AEP, Duke and AES to collect money from consumers to subsidize the utilities’ losses, after finding that the subsidies were permitted under the electric security plan law. When the PUCO originally granted the coal plant subsidy, PUCO Chair Asim Haque wrote “This should not be perceived as a blank check, and consumers should not be treated like a trust account.” 11 It is too bad for Ohio consumers that Chair Haque’s words have not been heeded by the PUCO or the legislature. By 2030, H.B. 6 will have provided that “blank check” to AEP, Duke and AES for $700 million, according to OMA in a 2020 study.12 And that does not include the many millions of dollars consumers were made to pay for the coal plants under PUCO subsidies prior to H.B. 6.
The PUCO’s external auditors who reviewed these subsidy charges revealed that the plant owners do not limit costs enough, as they often run the plants when the wholesale electric prices do not cover the plants’ variable costs. The auditor of AEP’s OVEC subsidy charge stated “The OVEC plants are offered into the PJM DA [day ahead] market as ‘must run,’ there are times during which the PJM DA prices [do] not cover the variable rates of running the plants.”13 Two separate auditors have recommended the OVEC Operating Committee meet more frequently to “prevent plants from running when energy prices are too low to cover variable costs.”14 AEP responded to the auditor’s recommendation by saying it “felt the current meeting schedule was adequate and they do not plan to make any changes.”15 Meanwhile consumers are losing money.
It is obvious the coal plant owners would be making better business decisions if they owned their losses instead of having a bailout from consumers, courtesy of H.B. 6. The H.B. 6 subsidies have worsened the coal plants’ response to the market by removing the market’s discipline for increasing efficiencies or decreasing expenses. Consumers bear the cost.
AEP is the loss leader for making consumers pay its OVEC coal plant subsidies. While AEP’s Ohio share of OVEC is 19.93%, AEP utilities in the region own more than 40% of the two OVEC plants. So, when you think about who the driver is for the coal plant subsidies from state government at consumer expense, especially think about AEP.
H.B. 6 codified these coal plant subsidies, taking them out from under the PUCO’s discretionary rulings. H.B. 6 guaranteed the subsidies beginning January 1, 2020, and extended charges to consumers until 2030. The claimed reason for subsidizing these coal plants that are relics of the 1950’s is “national security.” To explain why the connection to national security ended long ago for these plants, I have attached testimony from the Industrial Energy Users in this chamber on June 6, 2017. There is no present national security interest that justifies making Ohioans pay AEP, DP&L and Duke to subsidize these inefficient and dirty-air plants. Subsidizing these plants is unfair to Ohio families and businesses who pay for the subsidy.
In this regard, the Ohio Energy Group testified about H.B. 6 repeal in September 2020. In that testimony before the House Select Committee on Energy Policy and Oversight, OEG’s witness responded to questioning by saying “OVEC is a thorny problem.... What benefit do customers get from OVEC? Not really much. No. It’s a burden....”16 We agree.
A utility should “be fully on its own in the competitive market,” as we quoted above from O.R.C. 4928.38. That means markets, not utility monopolies (and subsidies), should determine what consumers pay for power plant generation. The coal plant subsidies in tainted House Bill 6 for AEP, Duke and AES/DP&L should be repealed for consumer protection. That repeal should result in lower electric bills and less air pollution.
The next question is when the coal subsidies should end. The answer should be now, or in the parlance of the bill, on the effective date of the bill (just like the Solar Generation Fund ends with the bill’s effective date). These H.B. 6 subsidies should not continue to be collected from consumers through the end of the currently existing utility plans. The H.B. 6 coal subsidies are charges that have nothing to do with the utilities’ approved electric security plans.17 Since the passage of H.B. 6, the subsidies have been collected in separate PUCO cases, outside of the utilities’ electric security plans.
Extending the coal subsidies beyond the effective date of House Bill 15 will be very costly for Ohio’s utility customers. If the coal subsidies continue through the end of Ohio utilities’ approved ESPs, it will add another $240 million to Ohioans’ electric bills.18
The sooner the H.B.6 subsidies are repealed, the better. Ohio’s utility consumers have borne the financial burden of these plants far too long.
I would also urge you to consider writing into H.B. 15 refunds to consumers for the coal subsidies paid for by consumers under tainted H.B. 6.19 Refunds to consumers for these charges would do much to restore the public’s trust in their Ohio government. The H.B. 6 scandal has been described as "likely the largest bribery, money laundering scheme ever perpetrated against the people of the state of Ohio.... This was pay to play.”20
The General Assembly can turn the clock back, as it did with other provisions of tainted H.B. 6. For instance, through House Bill 128 (134th General Assembly) the decoupling provision written into H.B. 6 was repealed and refunds were required for decoupling charges collected from consumers. Subsequently, FirstEnergy did refund the money collected and with interest to consumers. Refunds of the coal subsidies paid under tainted H.B. 6 can be legislated and should be. This is a needed protection given the sorry history of the lack of refunds for Ohio utility consumers. Attached is an OCC pie chart showing $1.5 billion in refunds denied to electric consumers since the 2008 energy law, after the Supreme Court invalidated various PUCO approved charges.
REPEAL OF ELECTRIC SECURITY PLANS
OCC has been a strong advocate of regulatory reform of electric security plans.21 OCC supports the repeal of the electric security plan statutes as soon as possible.
Electric security plans allow utilities to charge consumers for costly “riders.” Riders are add-on charges that allow utilities to cherry pick expenses and investments for expedited recovery with limited review. That ratemaking is an exception to Ohio rate case law that otherwise requires utility expenses, revenues and profits to be considered together in a case. Standard ratemaking does not allow such riders. Under an electric security plan, there is almost no limit on the type of riders the electric utilities can ask for. Our recent tally shows that Ohio Power has twenty-eight riders, Duke has thirty-eight riders, and AES has fourteen riders. The FirstEnergy Utilities take the prize with 46-48 riders.
Utilities also use electric security plans to obtain millions of dollars in subsidies from their consumers. These subsidies come in many sizes, shapes, and forms: lost revenues, decoupling, stability riders, distribution modernization charges, credit support, etc. OCC’s subsidy scorecard gives you an idea of the magnitude of the subsidy problem for utility consumers, with its $15.5 billion tally of subsidies paid for by consumers over the years (2000 to 2025). Approximately $3.7 billion is for subsidies paid under electric security plans implemented in 2009 and later and the OVEC coal subsidies under H.B. 6; about $11.8 billion reflects subsidies consumer paid to transition to deregulation. I have attached OCC’s subsidy scorecard for reference.
There’s more not to like about electric security plans. The 2008 Energy Law allows electric utilities to charge consumers for excessive profits- just not “significantly excessive profits.” That was an unfortunate modification to Ohio law which otherwise gives utilities only an opportunity to earn a “fair and reasonable” amount of profit based on current market conditions.
The 2008 Energy Law also allows electric utilities to withdraw their electric security plans if they don’t like the outcome of a PUCO order. It gives the utility a veto over the regulator and serves as an oversized bargaining chip that is used against other stakeholders. Ohio law does not give any other stakeholder this option to reject a PUCO decision.
There has been some talk that electric security plans are needed for economic development, They’re not. You’ve given the PUCO separate authority for that. And in electric security plan cases what passes as “economic development” can itself be part of the problem of the subsidy culture where utilities seek to get signatures on settlements for their subsidies with financial offers to others.
It's time to put a stop to this pro-utility, anti-consumer ratemaking. Ending these plans will go a long way in providing needed financial relief to Ohioans who are facing affordability challenges.
H.B. 15 allows current electric security plans to continue till their scheduled end. AES consumers would pay electric security plan rates through August 2026. AEP and Duke consumers will pay electric security plan rates through May 2028.22 FirstEnergy consumers pay electric security plan rates under FirstEnergy’s fourth electric security plan, which is in effect until its next electric security plan is approved. FirstEnergy has filed a new plan that has yet to be approved. Its pending plan would end in May 2028.
For clarity and to give much needed relief to utility consumers paying electric security plan rates, we suggest that H.B. 15 be amended to allow the plans to end as scheduled, but in no event later than 5/31/2028.
PRESERVATION OF THE STANDARD SERVICE OFFER
The electric utility’s standard service offer is essential to protect consumers. The standard service offer is the generation price that has been set either through a market rate offer or an electric security plan. While not perfect, the standard service offer is important to consumers. First, it is a default price option for generation service if consumers choose not to shop or if shopping is not available to them. Second, the standard service offer has been a useful price-to-compare (a benchmark) for consumers who are considering other choices. The utilities’ standard offer has been a competitive success story for consumers over many years.23 The utilities’ standard offers are a result of the fierce competitive bidding by suppliers to serve consumers. Consumers get the benefit of a market rate offer without the challenges of door-to-door sales, telemarketing and so forth.
Energy marketers oppose utilities’ standard offers as can be seen in the “principles” of the Retail Energy Supplier Association. There, the marketers’ association states that: “Default service should be …viewed as transitional, with a date certain set to achieve full retail energy competition where all customers are served by competitive suppliers and local distribution utilities are not involved in retail supply.”
The standard service offer is a safety net for consumers that must be preserved to protect consumers. Care must be taken to avoid loading up the standard service offer with costs that really belong to energy marketers. Requiring utility consumers to fund energy marketer costs is a consumer-funded subsidy that contributes to higher utility bills for consumers.
That brings us to the provision in H.B. 15 that establishes a new, untested Consumer Choice Billing Program, administered by the PUCO (See Lines 612-621, 2109-2114, and 2181-2497).
Under this program energy marketers can elect to provide consolidated billing services, even though billing services are already being provided by regulated utilities and have been paid for by all utility consumers. The costs of the duplicative billing program would be paid for (subsidized) by Ohio families and businesses through utilities’ distribution rates (Lines 2376-2380). That is unfair and unreasonable.
It is wrong to charge consumers for a new billing system when they have already paid for the utilities’ billing system. This would be a double charge to consumers for a service related to competitive generation paid for under regulated utility rates. And costs related to a marketers’ consumer billing services are costs that rightly should stay with the marketer.
If the consumer choice billing program goes forward, creating additional costs, the costs should be borne by the cost causer -- marketers, not by captive consumers of the electric distribution utility. For consumer protection, please do not require utility consumers to pay for duplicative billing systems of a marketer. This will only result in higher prices for Ohio families and businesses to fund greater profits for marketers.
CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, the current Ohio statutes allowing electric security plans and coal plant subsidies benefit utilities but at too great a cost to everyday Ohioans. The best way forward for protecting Ohioans and for growing the Ohio economy is to fully repeal the electric security plans statutes and end the unneeded coal plant subsidies. Doing so will provide significant financial relief to millions of Ohio citizens and businesses. Over time, House Bill 15 will enable a modern and constructive regulatory framework.
There is little doubt that many challenges lie ahead in ensuring all Ohio citizens have reliable and affordable energy. It will be a long and winding journey. House Bill 15 is certainly a positive step forward.
Thank you again for this critical consumer protection legislation. I will be happy to answer your questions.
1 Ohio Revised Code 4905.22.
2 Ohio Revised Code 4928.02-(L).
3 Ohio Revised Code 4928.02-(N).
4 The OVEC power plants operate under the contractual arrangement between with the OVEC Corporation and the owners of the OVEC power plants, including the three Ohio electric distribution utilities. According to a Duke executive, the OVEC plants will continue to run even if the subsidies from consumers end. See Spiller Testimony before the Ohio House Public Utilities Committee (HB 260) May 22, 2024. “Those assets owned and operated by OVEC will continue to operate with or without that legacy generation rider.” See Ohio Channel video, time marker 42:06 at https://www.ohiochannel.org/video/ohio-house-public-utilities-committee-5-22-2024?start=2526.
5 This $433 million is the real time running total shown at OCC web counter as of February 10, 2025. See OCC website (https://www.occ.ohio.gov/), for a real-time counter showing the cumulative collection of the OVEC subsidy since 2020.
6 Id.
7 OCC estimates that, from February 2020 through June 2025, the three electric distribution utilities, AEP, Duke and AES Ohio, have collected $495 million in OVEC subsidies under H.B. 6. This amounts to an average annual OVEC subsidies of $90 million over the five- and half-year period.
8 See OCC website: https://www.occ.ohio.gov/.
9 See Duke Executive Spiller’s Testimony before the Ohio House Public Utilities Committee (HB 260) May 22, 2024. “Those assets owned and operated by OVEC will continue to operate with or without that legacy generation rider.” See Ohio Channel video, time marker 42:06 at https://www.ohiochannel.org/video/ohio-house-public-utilities-committee-5-22-2024?start=2526.
10 This was recently confirmed by Fitch, a bond rating agency. Fitch concluded that “While regional demand growth (especially from data centers) may tighten energy markets, Fitch expects OVEC's all-in costs to exceed prevailing merchant power prices, making the plants uneconomical for the foreseeable future.”
11 In the Matter of the Application Seeking Approval of Ohio Power Company’s Proposal to Enter into an Affiliate Purchase Power Agreement, PUCO Case 14-1693-EL-RDR, Opinion and Order, Concurring Opinion of Chairman Haque at p.5 (March 31, 2016);
https://dis.puc.state.oh.us/ViewImage.aspx?CMID=A1001001A16C31B40932C01840
12 “Ohio’s Costly – and Worsening – OVEC Situation,” J. Seryak and P. Worley (November 12, 2020);
https://www.ohiomfg.com/wp-content/uploads/Ohios-Worsening-OVEC-Situation-11.9.2020-Final.pdf
13 Audit of the OVEC Power Purchase Agreement of Ohio Power Company” at p. 52, by London Economics, PUCO Case No. 18-1759-EL-RDR (September 16, 2020); https://dis.puc.state.oh.us/ViewImage.aspx?CMID=A1001001A20I17B31207C02236
14 Id. at page 53.
15 Id. at page 10.
16 Testimony of Mike Kurtz for the Ohio Energy Group, House Select Committee on Energy Policy and Oversight (September 23, 2020) (answering questions following his prepared testimony) http://ohiochannel.org/video/ohio-house-select-committee-on-energy-policy-and-oversight-9-23-2020?start=8806 (at video time marker 2:26:46).
17 The Legacy Generation Resource Rider was first established in PUCO Case No. 19-1808-EL-UNC, Entry (November 21, 2019). The Entry stated “In accordance with applicable legislative directives, the Commission establishes a replacement nonbypassable rate mechanism for the retail recovery of net legacy generation resource costs pursuant to R.C. 4928.148 for the period beginning January 1, 2020 and extending up to December 31, 2030.” The subsequent update of the rider was filed by the electric distribution utilities individually. For example, AEP’s updates were filed in PUCO Case No. 20-1118-EL-RDR.
18 This amount is calculated using a monthly collection of $7.5 million (i.e. annual collection of $90 million calculated from the $495 million collected over the five and half year period of 2020 to the first half of 2025) and the respective shares of AEP (58.91% or $4.418 million), Duke (26.60% or $1.995 million), and AES Ohio (14.48% or $1.086 million) based on their shares of the electricity generated by the two OVEC power plants. If the coal subsidies are extended through the end of the utilities’ electric security plans, AES Ohio will collect 14 additional months of coal subsidies, and AEP and Duke will collect 35 additional months of coal subsidies.
19 In a related vein, money collected from consumers for the Solar Generation Fund charge that has not been used should be refunded to consumers.
20 USA Today, “Ohio House Speaker Larry Householder arrested in $60 million bribery case,” by S. Coolidge, D. Horn and J. Balmert (June 21, 2020). https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/21/ohio-housespeaker-larry-householder-arrested-bribery-case-source/5478219002/.
21See, for example, Consumers’ Counsel Maureen Willis’s testimony on Senate Bill 143 on January 23, 2024 in https://www.occ.ohio.gov/testimony/sb-143/2024-01-23.
22 Duke has an ESP pending with an end date of May 2028 that has not been approved by the PUCO.
23 See, e.g., a recent Wall Street Journal story reflecting the importance of standard offers for consumers and that may marketer consumers are losing compared to the standard offers: https://www.wsj.com/articles/electricityderegulation-utility-retail-energy-bills-11615213623. See also a similar Columbus Dispatch story based on Columbia Gas data showing that, in the aggregate, marketer consumers are losing compared to Columbia’s standard offer: https://www.dispatch.com/article/20160404/NEWS/304049819